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LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE*
BENJAMIN AARON**
I. TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD OUR LABOR RELATIONS SYSTEM
The modern era of labor relations law in the United States may be
said, somewhat arbitrarily, to have begun with the adoption of the
Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932.1 There followed in swift succession the
1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act2 and the Wagner Act of
1935.1 The national labor relations policy was fleshed out still further by
the Taft-Hartley Act of 19474 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.1 With
one exception in respect of state right-to-work laws,6 the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts established the supremacy of federal law over state
laws in the labor relations field.
* This is an expanded version of the thirty-fourth annual John Randolph Tucker lec-
ture, delivered at the Washington and Lee University on 8 May 1982.
** Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§
101-115 (1976)).
Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended by ch. 426, 48 Stat. 926
(1934) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970)).
' National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976)).
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976)).
5 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No.
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)).
1 Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C: § 164(b) (1976), provides:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of
agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in
any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Ter-
ritorial law."
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During this period and well beyond, the attitude of American courts,
legislatures, labor law scholars and practitioners, and employers and
unions toward our labor relations system can best be described as solip-
sistic: our system was regarded as the only reality, and almost no in-
terest was shown toward labor relations laws and practices in other
countries, except to the extent that we sought to impose versions of our
own laws on our defeated enemies, notably Japan, at the conclusion of
World War II. The occasional reference by our Supreme Court to foreign
labor laws was no less remarkable for its rarity in 19631 than it was in
1944.8 When the first American labor law casebook to include extensive
notes on foreign labor law appeared in 1953, the notice in the Harvard
Law Review9 did not even mention that aspect of the book, while the
notice in the Columbia Law Review, 0 although describing the foreign
law materials as "interesting and provocative" to full-time labor law
practitioners, thought they "raise[d] the level of discussion somewhat
higher than is useful to students."'1
II. RECENT CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN EXPERIENCE
In more recent times the picture has changed. The sharp rise in the
number of American companies doing business abroad, the development
of international law firms based in the United States, the more frequent
exchanges between American and foreign labor law and industrial rela-
tions scholars, and the general shrinking of the world in terms of inter-
national communication and travel have all helped to arouse our interest
in the ways other countries handle labor relations problems similar to
ours. It has come as a shock to many of our labor law specialists,
however, to learn that some features of our system, far from exemplify-
ing the international norm, are regarded by foreign observers as anom-
alous, if not downright peculiar.2 Only relatively recently have we begun
to study our labor law system with a view to understanding why some of
its fundamental aspects are virtually unique, and how they came to be
that way. Such an understanding, of course, must begin with some
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 123-29 (1963).
J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944).
Reilly, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 532, 532-36 (1954) (LABOR RELATIONS AND THE
LAW (R. Mathews ed. 1953)).
'0 Iserman, Book Review, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 302 (1954).
n Id. at 303. That judgment now seems quaintly amusing; it reminds one of the scene
in Oscar Wilde's play, "The Importance of Being Earnest," in which Miss Prism, the
governess, directs her pupil to read her book on political economy but to omit the chapter
on the Fall of the Rupee, because it is "somewhat too sensational." "Even these metallic pro-
blems," she adds, "have their melodramatic sides."
12 The emergency disputes procedures in the Labor Management Relations Act, §§
206-209, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-179 (1976), for example, are frequently criticized. See Wedderburn,
Industrial Action, the State and the Public Interest, in INDUSTRIAL ACTION: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL SURVEY 320 (B. Aaron & K. Wedderburn eds. 1972).
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knowledge of the way various problems common to industralized coun-
tries are handled in other systems of labor relations law; and it is the use
of that knowledge to illuminate our own experience and to examine it
from a new perspective that is the essence of the comparative method.
III. PIONEERS OF COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Contemporary students of comparative labor law in the United
States must acknowledge their special debt to three fellow countrymen
who have pioneered in this area of the American wilderness. The first,
Arthur Lenhoff, was a naturalized citizen, who left his native Austria,
where he had been a successful lawyer, university professor, and judge
of the Constitutional Court, and came to the United States at the age of
52 as a refugee from Nazi persecution. Like the late Professor Sir Otto
Kahn-Freund in England, Lenhoff, who died in 1965, mastered our alien
system of law with astonishing rapidity and then built a second
distinguished career as professor of law, scholar, and legal practitioner.
In the field of labor law his writings are remarkable for this explication
of differences between American laws and those of continental Euro-
pean countries-differences of which most American labor scholars had
previously been unaware.13 In the words of one of his contemporaries at
the Buffalo School of Law,
Dr. Lenhoff's work may still be seen as part of that great influx
of European ideas into the stream of American legal scholarship.
At times these ideas influenced court decisions directly; more
often they made creative contributions to the growing critical
spirit . . . which eventually influenced teachers, scholars,
students, lawyers, legislators and courts alike. 4
Another to whom we are particularly indebted is Derek C. Bok,
formerly professor of law and dean of the Harvard Law School, and cur-
rently president of Harvard University. Bok's brilliant and comprehen-
sive article, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor
Law,1 5 has gained a high and lasting place in the literature of com-
parative labor law.
,1 Among Lenhoffs writings in English on labor law, the following are particularly
noteworthy: The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System, 39
MICH. L. REV. 1109 (1941); A Century of American Unionism, 22 B.U.L. REV. 357 (1942); The
Right to Work: Here and Abroad, 46 ILL. L. REV. 669 (1951); Some Basic Features of
American and European Labor Law: A Comparison, 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 389 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as Labor Law]; Basic Features of Foreign Labor Law, in LABOR RELA-
TIONS AND THE LAW 63 (R. Mathews ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as Basic Features]; and The
Problem of Compulsory Unionism in Europe, 5 AM. J. CoMp. L. 18 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as Compulsory Unionism].
" Touster, Reflections on the Emigri Scholar. In Memory of Arthur Lenhoff, 16 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 1, 3 (1966).
"5 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bok].
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Finally, we are obligated to Professor Clyde Summers, of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, for his seminal essay, American
and European Labor Law: The Use and Usefulness of Foreign Ex-
perience," which, although less comprehensive than Bok's article, was
nevertheless one of the first to demonstrate the "insularity and unique-
ness" of American Labor law, as well as to point out both the value and
the limitations inherent in the comparative study of labor law.
Some of what follows is derived from the writings of these
distinguished scholars.
IV. PRIMARY INFLUENCES ON THE AMERICAN LABOR
RELATIONS SYSTEM
Bok's thesis, with which I concur, is "that the patterns of behavior
and the institutions that make up our system of industrial relations have
had a more fundamental influence than any other factor on the major
lines of substantive law in this country."'7 The lack of class-consciousness
among American workers, their resistance to organization, their preoc-
cupation with so-called business-or "bread-and-butter"- unionism, and
their relative lack of involvement in politics contrast sharply with the
behavior of their counterparts in Europe. Thus, workers in Europe are
more closely identified with political parties- Social-Democratic, Com-
munist, Christian, and a number of others across the entire political
spectrum-than they are with particular unions.'" Indeed, as Lenhoff
remarked ,of labor organizations affiliated with the Social-Democratic
Party in pre-World War I Germany and Austria, "the unions were the
Party's creatures rather than its masters;"'9 whereas American workers
have traditionally elevated loyalty to their unions over adherence to
political parties, and have largely been content to follow the admonition
of their leaders to reward their friends and punish their enemies.2
Similarly, the tendency of American employers to go it alone and
their traditional reluctance to organize into associations for the purpose
of dealing with unions have led to a decentralized pattern of industrial
relations in this country that is markedly different from the highly cen-
tralized system of bargaining that is characteristic of European coun-
tries.2 ' Moreover, American employers have shown a far more persistent
16 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 210 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Summers].
'7 Bok, supra note 15, at 1400. But see Summers, supra note 16, at 221: "[E]xplaining
labor law as the product of social institutions and attitudes oversimplifies the linkage of
cause and effect."
" See Basic Features, supra note 13, at 63-66.
" Id. at 65.
20 For the origin of the phrase "reward your friends and punish your enemies," see 2 J.
COMMONS & ASSOCIATES, HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED STATES 531 (1918).
" See Bok, supra note 15, at 1405: "In all of the other countries surveyed [England.
France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Australia, and New
Zealand], negotiations with trade unions have been conducted in the main through associa-
tions representing a single industry or a group of related industries."
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and militant resistance to unions than their European counterparts,
which accounts in part for the fact that a lower percentage of workers in
America is organized than is the case in any industralized country in
Western Europe.'
V. EUROPEAN INTERVENTIONISM AND AMERICAN VOLUNTARISM
In Europe, especially in Germany, the early involvement of workers
in politics led to the system of government "interventionism," that is,
the process of translating political strength into protective social legisla-
tion.' By contrast, workers and their unions in the United States,
especially prior to the advent of the New Deal in the 1930s, had a deeply
ingrained suspicion of government and were thus committed to "volun-
tarism," the philosophy that economic and social gains must be achieved
without interference or aid from government. In the words of Samuel
Gompers,
The mass of the workers are convinced that laws necessary for
their protection against the most grievous wrongs cannot be
passed except after long and exhausting struggles; that such
beneficient measures as become laws are nullified by the unwar-
ranted decisions of the courts; that the laws which stand upon
the statute books are not equally enforced; and that the whole
machinery of government has frequently been placed at the
disposal of the employers for the oppression of the workers.24
When the American Federation of Labor, virtually crushed by the
Great Depression of the 1930s, was finally forced to support the
statutory labor program of the New Deal, it did not wholly abandon
voluntarism; nor was there any occasion to do so, for the United States
did not follow the European pattern of interventionism. Although the
Wagner Act created the framework for collective bargaining and made
it an unfair labor practice for employers to engage in various efforts to
frustrate the formation of unions or to subvert the bargaining process, 5
the substantive terms of collective agreements were not dictated by
government. With the exception of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA),26 which imposed mandatory, nonwaivable minimum wages, over-
Organized labor as a percent of the nonagricultural labor force in 1976 was 23 per-
cent in the United States; 44 percent in Australia; 67 percent in Austria; 21 percent in
Canada; 60 percent in Finland; 31 percent in the German Federal Republic; 65 percent in
Denmark; 80 percent in Sweden; and 40 percent in the United Kingdom. N. CHAMBERLAIN,
D. CULLEN & D. LEWIN, THE LABOR SECTOR 125 (1980).
See Basic Features, supra note 13, at 64.
24 Quoted in G. HIGGINS, VOLUNTARISM IN ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES,
1930-1940, at 31 (1944), cited in I. BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
POLICY 23 (1950).
' National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 8(a)(1)-(a)(5), 49 Stat. 452 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(a05) (1976)).
" Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (1976)).
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time pay provisions, and restrictions on child labor, the federal govern-
ment passed virtually no laws regulating wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment. Organized workers were entitled to
whatever benefits their unions could exact from employers in collective
bargaining; unorganized workers received only what the FLSA required
and what their employers were willing to dispense in their unfettered
discretion. Although most collective agreements provided that
employees could not be disciplined or discharged except for just cause,
unorganized employees without individual contracts of employment for
fixed terms were considered in law to be employed "at will," subject to
discharge at any time for any reason or no reason.
The contrasting situation in continental European countries was
described by Lenhoff as one in which
every employee, whether a member of a union or not, enjoys by
statute many of the rights and privileges which in ... [the United
States] can be acquired only by contract. [These include] [n]ot
merely protection against abrupt discharge, but also vacations
with pay, wages during absence due to illness or other urgent,
personal reasons, and during a period of idleness caused by
reduction of plant operations, pay upon permanent discharge,
and many other benefits .... 28
VI. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW
A. Exclusive Representation
The difficulty in organizing American workers and the enduring
resistance of American employers to unionism, together with the strong
jurisdictional rivalries among unions, resulted in perhaps the most
distinctive feature of collective bargaining in the United States: the prin-
ciple of exclusive representation. In order to insure that the collective
bargaining power of employees had the best chance of matching that of
the employer, the Wagner Act established the principle that a union
representing an uncoerced majority of employees in a bargaining unit
shall be empowered to act as the exclusive representative of all
employees for purposes of collective bargaining, including those who
refused to join or who actively opposed the union.29 This is an arrange-
ment manifestly impracticable in those countries in which unions are
organized on political or religious lines; it is also unnecessary where, as
I The dubious authority for the "employment at will" rule is H. WOOD, MASTER AND
SERVANT § 134 (1877). See Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV.
335, 341-43 (1974).
' Basic Features, supra note 13, at 66.
" National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, §§ 9(a) & 8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 452 (1935)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a) & 158(a)(5) (1976)). See also J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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in most other countries, employers have long since ceased their active
resistance to unionism and where basic terms and conditions of employ-
ment are fixed by statute rather than by individual or collective
agreements.
As Summers has observed, "uniqueness tends to beget unique-
ness."3 Constitutional considerations led inevitably to the requirement
that a union clothed with the statutory powers of exclusive representa-
tion must be required to represent all employees in the bargaining
unit-union members and nonmembers alike-fairly and without hostile
or invidious discrimination. The duty of fair representation, in turn, ex-
acerbated the unions' hostility to so-called free riders-those who enjoy
the benefits of the collective agreement but refuse either to join the
union or to pay their fair share of its collective bargaining costs. This
helps to explain why union security, in its various manifestations, re-
mains a mdjor issue in our labor relations system,32 whereas, for reasons
already indicated, it is not sought by unions in most other countries and
is in fact illegal in many of them." Finally, awareness of the economic
power. that unions derived from the right of exclusive representation
gave impetus to the demand that their internal laws and procedures be
fair and democratic. And just as union security is not an issue in most
European countries, so there is little or no legislation regulating internal
union affairs.
B. Industrial Conflict
Industrial conflict is, of course, a universal phenomenon. In the
words of Kahn-Freund, the greatest of all modern comparative law
scholars: "The conflict between capital and labour is inherent in an in-
dustrial society and therefore in the labour relationship. Conflicts of in-
terests are inevitable in all societies. There are rules for their adjust-
ment, there can be no rules for their elimination." 4
This obvious truth does not explain, however, why the problem of
regulating industrial conflict has for so long been such an overwhelming
preoccupation of American labor law. Writing in 1951, Lenhoff found the
Summers, supra note 16, at 218.
31 The doctrine of fair representation was first enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199-208 (1944), a case arising under the
Railway Labor Act. The doctrine was subsequently applied to cases arising under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. See especially Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See Aaron,
The Duty of Fair Representation: An Overview, in THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 8 (J.
McKelvey ed. 1977).
1 "Union security" is used to describe any agreement with an employer that compels
members of a bargaining unit, as a condition of continued employment, either to join the
union representing that unit or to contribute a fair share of the costs of collective bargain-
ing. Opponents of union security prefer the term, "compulsory unionism."
I See Compulsory Unionism, supra note 13, at 18-43.
3, 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 17 (2d ed. 1977).
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explanation "in the fact that contractualism still constitutes the soul and
life-blood of American labor law. . ."I' He contrasted the situation in
Germany and France, where social legislation was the product of "the
conquest of political power by socialistic parties," with that in the
United States in the 1930s, when our basic labor laws were primarily in-
fluenced by the economic theories of Keynes and Hansen, conceived of
"in terms of an increase in purchasing power among industrial workers
as consumers rather than in terms of a revolutionary democratization of
business enterprise."3 The emphasis remained on the exercise of
bargaining power by unions and their contractual relations with
employers. The prevailing view continued to be that government should
not attempt to interfere with market forces by fixing the substantive
terms of employment, but should allow them to be set through collective
bargaining. The corollary of that principle was that collective agree-
ments must be mutually enforceable, and tactics by employers and
unions, especially the latter, that interfered too drastically with the
operation of the so-called free market, or created wide-scale interrup-
tions in production or serviceg that threatened the national health or
safety, must be prohibited or extensively regulated by law. Those ideas
found their expression in a plethora of statutory provisions dealing with
strikes, lockouts, secondary boycotts, "featherbedding," jurisdictional
disputes, and the like."
These laws can be explained as the natural outgrowths of our
history, institutions, and political and economic philosophy; but that is
hardly a reason for our supposing that they represent the best, if not the
only, way to deal with industrial conflict. The weakness of that assump-
tion has been exposed by Summers:
The proposition that collective agreements should be binding on
employer and union alike, and that legal remedies should be
available, is accepted by many in this country as being as un-
questionable as the Euclidean theorem. But when we learn that
in England the collective agreement is legally binding on neither
party; that in Belgium the employer is bound but there is no
legal remedy against the union; that in Germany the union is
bound but it has no effective remedy against the employer; that
in France the employer has no legal remedy against the worker;
and that in Sweden there are legal remedies against the union,
the employer and the individual worker -when we learn this, we
are compelled to recognize that our self-evident assumptions are
self-generated. 8
Labor Law, supra note 13, at 391.
, Id. at 407-08 (italics in original).
E.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6) ("featherbedding"); §
158(b)(4) (boycotts); § 158(b)(7) (picketing) (1976).
1 Summers, supra note 16, at 222 (citations omitted).
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C. Strikes by Government Employees
Our laws against secondary boycotts, among others, also lack the
logical necessity commonly attributed to them in this country; but
perhaps the greatest gap in this general area is between our laws and
those of European countries relating to government employees.
Although a number of European countries bar strikes by limited groups
of public servants, such as police, armed forces, the judiciary, postal
workers, and air traffic and harbor authorities, only a few have so per-
vasive a prohibition on such strikes by government employees as exists
in the United States, and in some of those countries the rule is not en-
forced. 9 In our country the total ban on strikes by federal employees is
strictly enforced, as air traffic controllers recently learned to their sor-
row, and in only eight of the fifty states have government employees
even a limited right to strike-so limited, in fact, that it is virtually inef-
fective." In the remaining states the right to strike is forbidden either
expressly by statute or by common law. This circumstance is remarkable
in that many states have enacted laws permitting collective bargaining
by government employees modeled after the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), which recognizes the right to strike as fundamental to the
process of collective bargaining and which only marginally limits its ex-
ercise.4' The prevailing policy is remarkable, too, in that it persists in the
face of a steadily increasing number of illegal strikes by government
employees at state, county, and municipal levels.
4 2
" Krick, The Freedom to Organize of Public Servants, in 2 THE FREEDOM OF THE
WORKER TO ORGANIZE 1297, 1305-08 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Kriick].
40 Eight states-Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin-provide a limited right to strike to some groups of government
employees. An example of the limitations imposed even when the right to strike exists is of-
fered by the Hawaiian statute, HAWAII REV. STAT. ,§ 89-12 (1976 & 1981 Supp). Under
Hawaiian law, strikes-are permitted by employees who are members of an appropriate
bargaining unit represented by a certified bargaining agent, provided that no procedure to
settle the dispute by binding arbitration is available and that the employees involved are
not "essential:' Before striking, employees must comply in good faith with the statutory im-
passe procedures; wait until 60 days after the findings and recommendations of a fact-
finding board are made public; and give 10 day's notice of a desire to strike to the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) and the employer. Even then, if the PERB finds that
there is imminent danger to the health and safety of the public, it must set requirements, in-
cluding the designation of certain positions as "essential," that must be complied with to
avoid or remove such danger.
", Section 13 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, provides: "Nothing in
this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to in-
terfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations
or qualifications on that right." 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1976).
" Data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics show, for exam-
ple, that in 1958 there were 15 strikes involving 1.7 thousand federal, state, and local
government employees for a total of 7.5 thousand days idle. The corresponding figures for
1975 were 478, 318.5, and 2,204.4, respectively. Most of these strikes were illegal. See H. ED-
WARDS, R. CLARK & C. CRAVER (eds.), LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 493 (2d
ed. 1979).
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Interestingly enough, the country at the opposite pole from the
United States in this regard is Sweden-a nation whose system of labor
relations is regarded by many Americans as a model of civilized and
sophisticated accommodation of conflicting interests. The Swedish legal
system recognizes that the right to strike is the same for government as
for private employees, the only limitation on government employees be-
ing that strikes for the purpose of influencing internal political matters
are not allowed, nor are strikes in support of employees in the private
sector.4 3 The Swedish government has also succeeded in excluding cer-
tain highranking officials from the universal right to strike, but only by
negotiating provisions for such exclusions in its collective agreements
with unions."
D. Grievance Arbitration
One feature of labor relations in the United States that seems to
have the support of most employers and unions in the organized sector
of the economy is the principle, embodied in legislation," that disputes
arising out of the interpretation and application of collective agreements
should be settled through the grievance and arbitration procedures
typically included in such agreements. Disputes of this type are known
in this country as "grievances," and in other countries as disputes over
"rights," or "legal" disputes. There is a widely recognized distinction
between rights disputes, on the one hand, and disputes over the terms of
initial or new collective agreements, commonly referred to as
"interests" disputes, on the other. In this country and in Canada, most
strikes over grievances are illegal, whereas most strikes over interests
disputes are lawful. At the same time, the handling of an interests
dispute by means of the grievance-arbitration procedure during the life
of a collective agreement is a rarity, the idea being that all such issues
should be reserved for the negotiation of a new agreement.
This system works well for us; it may be our most successful inven-
tion in the labor relations field. Contrary to the belief of many Amer-
13 Hemstrom, The Freedom of the Worker to Organize in Sweden, in 1 THE FREEDOM
OF THE WORKER TO ORGANIZE 771, 787 (1980).
" Kriick, supra note 39, at 1307.
, E.g., Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1976),
provides in part: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over application or the
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement .... Section 3 of the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1970) requires that all disputes "growing out of grievances or
out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions" shall be submitted to final and binding adjudication by either the ap-
propriate division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board or by a system, group, or
regional board of adjustment established by the parties. Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1976), provides in part: "No restraining order or injuctive relief shall
be granted to any complainant ... who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle
[a labor dispute] ... with the aid of ... voluntary arbitration."
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icans, however, it has no exact analogue outside of North America.
Although highly idiosyncratic forms of arbitration are used to a limited
extent in some other countries, labor courts are by far the most common
mechanism for adjudicating rights disputes. 6 Why is a system that
seems so reasonable and efficient to us viewed with scepticism in so
many other countries? The answer is that it makes sense only in a con-
text that is peculiarly American. Consider all the preconditions required
to make it work. There must first be an acceptance on the part of the
bargaining parties, supported by law, that agreements to arbitrate and
arbitration awards shall be specifically enforceable by the courts. There
must also be an understanding-usually explicit, but sometimes im-
plicit-that there will be no strikes or other interruptions of work dur-
ing the life of the agreement over matters that are subject to arbitra-
tion.' This means, in turn, that collective agreements must be for fixed
terms; otherwise parties would be unwilling to postpone indefinitely the
exercise of their right to engage in strikes, lockouts, or other forms of in-
dustrial action permissible in interests disputes. Finally, because griev-
ances involve terms and conditions of an existing collective bargaining
agreement, and because the parties to that agreement are the employer
and the union, the latter must be in complete control of the grievance-
arbitration procedure. Subject only to its duty of fair representation, the
union must be allowed exchisively to decide whether to file a grievance,
settle it, or take it to arbitration.
This being understood, it is at once apparent why our grievance-
arbitration system is unacceptable in Britain, for example, where collec-
tive bargaining contracts are regarded as gentlemen's agreements,
unenforceable in court, and are open-ended, rather than for fixed terms.
The latter characteristic has, in turn, resulted in the obliteration of the
distinction between rights disputes and interests disputes as well as the
absence of no-strike provisions in collective agreements. 8 Consequently,
even where grievance and arbitration procedures exist, the occurrence
of a dispute over the interpretation or application of the agreement is
frequently marked by a partial or general stoppage of work' 9- the very
circumstance that the grievance-arbitration system in this country is
designed to prevent.
For somewhat different reasons, our system is unacceptable in a
46 Aaron, Arbitration and the Role of Courts: The Administration of Justice in Labor
Law, in I PROCEEDINGS OF THE IXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY 27 (1979).
17 See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
" See K. WEDDERBURN & P. DAVIES, EMPLOYMENT GRIEVANCES AND DISPUTES PRO-
CEDURES IN BRITAIN (1969), especially Forward, at vii.
" The overwhelming number of strikes in Britain are "unofficial," ie., "they take place
in disregard of an existing agreement laying down a procedure for the attempted settle-
ment of a dispute before strike action is taken." ROYAL COMM'N ON TRADE UNIONS AND
EMPLOYERS ASS'NS 1965-1968 (DONOVAN COMM'N), Para. 367 (Cmnd. 3623, 1968).
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number of continental European countries. Fundamentally, the problem
is that grievance-arbitration procedures in the United States are volun-
tary and private, and are typically negotiated at plant level between
single companies and local unions." Contrast this situation with that in
France, for example, where labor disputes are not settled within the
enterprise.
Internal organizations representing workers have only limited
powers; they may promote voluntary settlement of a grievance
or act as a screening agency, but they ... cannot really take part
in the final settlement of a dispute .... Union participation is
more or less insignificant because of ... union pluralism and the
rule that unions can represent their members only . . . and
because settlement procedures are usually prescribed by
statutory law rather than by collective agreement. . . . [In
French law ... all employees are entitled to the same minimum
protection, which must be furnished by the legislature. Thus, ex-
isting procedures tend to accommodate state agencies, such as
judges and government officials, rather than unions or private
individuals, and the French system may be characterized as one
of public order in which the state is almost omnipresent.'
Comparisons of Western European labor court systems with the
American arbitration system reveal that the former tend to dispose of
most rights disputes more quickly and cheaply than does the latter, but
that the remedies available, notably reinstatement for wrongful dis-
missal, are broader in the United States.2 Against that advantage,
however, must be weighed the availability of the European labor courts
to all employees, whereas in the United States, with statistically insig-
nificant exceptions, arbitration of grievances is available only to organiz-
ed workers and, even then, is subject to considerable control by their ex-
clusive bargaining representatives.
VII. RECENT CHANGES IN THE SUBSTANCE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAWS
So far, I have attempted, through the use of several examples, to
show some of the distinctive features of American labor relations laws;
to explain, albeit rather superficially, why they differ so widely from
laws of European countries relating to the same general subjects; and to
suggest that a study of foreign solutions to common problems may give
us new insights into our own. I shall return to the last of these points at
the end of this essay.
Before doing so, however, I want to draw attention to what seems to
Bok, supra note 15, at 1409.
, Blanc-Jouvan, The Settlement of Labor Disputes in France, in LABOR COURTS AND
GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE 13-14 (B. Aaron ed. 1971).
52 Aaron, Labor Courts: Western European Models and Their Significance for the
United States, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 847 (1969).
1258 [Vol. 39:1247
LABOR RELATIONS LAW
me to be significant, indeed profound, changes in the content of labor
laws in this country-changes that bring them into closer harmony with
their European counterparts than ever before.
Increasingly, in the last twenty years, the federal government has
enacted laws vitally affecting the employment relations that are general
in application and make no distinction between organized and unorganized
workers. The best known of these laws is Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended,53 which prohibits employers, employment agen-
cies, and unions from discriminating in hiring, employment conditions, or
membership because of any individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional 'origin. Other laws include the Equal Pay Act of 1963,"4 which bans
pay discrimination between employees on the basis of sex; the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended," which bars
employers, employment agencies, and unions from discriminating in hir-
ing, employment conditions, or membership because of age against any
individual between the ages of forty and seventy; the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, as amended,56 which, among other things, declares that no other-
wise qualified handicapped individual shall be discriminated against,
solely by reason of his handicap, under any program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance, or conducted by any executive agency or by
the United States Postal Service; the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, as amended,57 designed to promote and to regulate
the fiscal soundness and financial and social integrity of pivately funded
employee retirement programs; and the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970,"s which requires virtually all private employers to furnish
workers with an environment that is free from recognized hazards likely
to cause death or serious harm. In addition, there are other protective
laws and numerous executive orders directing various government agen-
cies to take affirmative action in aid of certain group of employees, again
without regard to whether they are union members.
Despite the exceptions and exemptions found in all of these statutes
and orders, they comprise a body of employment or social legislation
that is comparable to that in existence in European countries. The ele-
ment of contractualism that remains in our laws permits the waiver of
the rights they create, whereas the comparable provisions in European
laws are generally nonwaivable 9
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) (original version at Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241 (1964)).
" Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976)).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976) (original version at Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)).
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795i (1976 & 1981 Supp.) (original version at Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87
Stat. 355 (1973)).
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976) (original version at Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974)).
Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976)).
5 See Basic Features, supra note 13, at 68-69: "Centuries of interventionism led the
way to the present European labor law, under which the parties cannot alter, modify, or ex-
clude what the statute provides for."
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The long-range effect of this newly created body of social legislation
in the United States is bound to be of the greatest importance. Union
membership (exclusive of Canada), as a percentage of both the total
labor force and the nonagricultural labor force, has declined steadily
from 22.7 percent and 32.6 percent, respectively, in 1954 to 19.7 percent
and 23.6 percent, respectively, in 1978.0 Thus, an increasing percentage
of employees have had to look to the government, rather than to unions
and collective bargaining agreements, for employment protection. If
these trends of increased social legislation and diminished union mem-
bership continue, the basic role of unions in this country may come more
closely to resemble that of their European counterparts, namely, to pro-
pose social legislation and to seek to gain political power sufficient to in-
sure that such legislation is enacted; to police the enforcement of that
legislation against employers; and to attempt, through collective
bargaining, to improve upon the minimum terms and *conditions of
employment fixed by that legislation.
One of the most distinctive features of American labor law is the
lack of statutory protection against unfair and abusive treatment, in-
cluding discharge, of unorganized employees. Among the industralized
countries of the world, the United States has the dubious distinction of
standing virtually alone in this regard. Even here, however, there are
signs that the old rules may be changing. Although attempts in a few
states to enact statutes requiring that the discharge of unorganized
employees be only for just cause" have so far been unsuccessful, and in
my view are not likely to be enacted in the foreseeable future,62 some
courts have shown a disposition to insist upon that requirement. 3 In-
deed, one prominent academic authority, Professor Cornelius J. Peck,
has boldly predicted
that American courts will abandon the principle that, absent
some consideration other than the services to be performed, a
contract of employment for an indefinite term is to be considered
. terminable at will by either party, with the consequence that
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS,
BULL. No. 2070, Table 165, at 412 (1980).
6! E.g., Connecticut: Committee Bill No. 8738, Gen. Ass., Jan. Sess. (1973); Committee
Bill No. 5179, Gen. Ass., Jan. Sess. (1974); Committee Bill No. 5151, Gen. Ass., Jan. Sess.
(1975); Michigan: Unjust Discharge Bill (unpublished draft) (1979); New Jersey: Ass. No.
1832 (1980). See generally Summers, Administration of Unjust Dismissak A Preliminary
Proposal, in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 159 (J. Correge, V. Hughes &
M. Stone, eds. 1976).
"2 See Aaron, The Ownership of Jobs: Observations on the American Experience, in
JOB EQUITY AND OTHER STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 50, 85-86 (W. Fogel ed. 1982).
E.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980); Frampton
v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
1260 [Vol. 39:1247
LABOR RELATIONS LAW
the employer may discharge an employee for any cause, no
cause, or even bad cause. Instead, courts will require that
employers have just cause for terminating the employment rela-
tionship. A further consequence will be that courts will also re-
quire proof of just cause for any serious disciplinary action by
employers."4
Other academic writers, although perhaps not so confident in their
predictions, have argued in favor of the outcome described by Peck."
Should his vision of the future prove to be correct, unions would be
deprived of one of their most persuasive organizing arguments, namely,
that only they can protect workers from the abusive powers of em-
ployers. That circumstance might well have an inhibiting effect on union
growth.
VIII. USES AND MISUSES OF COMPARATIVE LAW
At the outset of this essay I referred to a relatively newly awakened
interest in this country in comparative labor law. As sometimes hap-
pens, however, when scholars, students, and practitioners of labor law,
as well as employers and unions, are exposed to new theories and em-
pirical data, they react to them with automatic hostility or uncritical en-
thusiasm. The latter of these reactions is, perhaps, more dangerous than
the former: hostility can yield over time to persuasion, if the new ideas
prove to be practical and workable; but uncritical enthusiasm may lead
to efforts to adopt exogenous theories or practices that cannot take root
in alien soil. TO; mention but one example, the British Industrial Rela-
tions Act, 1971, which incorporated some concepts from the American
Taft-Hartley Act that were totally at odds with British experience, turned
out to be a major disaster and had to be repealed.66 In the United States
the danger lies less in the possibility of enacting into legislation foreign
solutions unsuited to our political, economic, and social environment
than in the too ready acceptance by some employers and unions of con-
cepts in the labor-management field that seem to be working well in
other countries. I shall mention only one example-the substantial cur-
rent interest in worker participation schemes.
Worker participation in management is pervasive throughout most
" Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 1-2 (1979).
E.g., A. BERLE, THREE FACES OF POWER 39-41 (1967); Blades, Employment at Will v.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1404 (1967); Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employees Against Un-
just Discharge, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 32ND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
RESEARCH ASS'N 155 (B. Dennis ed. 1979); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974).
See Sandison, A Rejected Transplant. The British Industrial Relations Act
1971-1974), 3 IND. REL. L. J. 247 (1979).
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of the industrialized world, not the least so in the United States. It may
come as a surprise to some that unions in this country have a statutory
right to participate in managerial decisions far exceeding that of their
counterparts in most other countries. Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the
NLRA require employers to bargain in good faith with the exclusive
bargaining representatives of their employees on "rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.""7 Decisions of
the NLRB, enforced by the courts, have expanded this duty to embrace
virtually every managerial decision that affects the employment rela-
tion. 8 Even within the small area still reserved for unilateral determina-
tion by the employer, such as the decision to close down a plant or a
department for bona fide economic reasons, management will still have
to bargain over the impact of such closure on the employees affected. 9
Of course, the duty to bargain in good faith does not require that
agreement be reached at any cost; Section 8(d) of the NLRA specifically
declares that "such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.""0 Nevertheless, bargain-
ing in good faith by both parties produces agreement in the great majority
of cases.71 In addition, grievance-arbitration procedures insure the right
of unions to enforce whatever substantive agreements have been reached.
It is not surprising, therefore, that American unions have found this
system of participation in management preferable to foreign versions in
which workers' representatives participate in varying degrees with
management in making initial decisions.72
In an outstanding review of United States experience with workers'
participation in management, Professor Adolf F. Sturmfhal summarized
his findings in part as follows:
1. The United States system of industrial relations rejects
in principle, and almost always in practice, all forms of workers'
7 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
Terms and conditions of employment for which employers have a duty to bargain in
good faith include: Christmas bonuses; pension and other welfare programs; profit-sharing
and stock-purchase plans; merit wage increases; seniority, promotion, and transfers; union
security; plant rules; subcontracting; and partial closure of business and plant relocation.
See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW ch. XXI (1976).
69 See NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
,0 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
", In 1979 there were only 4800 work stoppages in the United States; only 1.6 percent
of the total of employed workers was involved, and the percent of estimated working time
lost resulting from strikes was only .15. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. No. 2070, Table 167 (1980).
" The literature on the subject of worker participation in management is extensive.
See, e.g., BULL. OF COMP. LAB. REL. No. 8, Worker's Participation in the European Company
(1977); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES, BULLS. No. 2, 64-125 (Feb. 1967), No.
5, 136-220 (Nov. 1968), No. 6, 54-186 (June 1969), No. 7, 153-285 (June 1970), No. 9, 129-207




representation in official managerial bodies. The union wishes to
be a critic rather than a partner in management, and union in-
fluence is exerted almost exclusively by negotiation and griev-
ance handling....
2. The union does not accept formal responsibility for the
life of the plant or the undertaking. Even when ... unions make a
major contribution to the efficient management of plants....
[they] have consistently refused to assume formal responsibility
for plant management ....
4. To the extent to which a union acts as a participant in
managerial decision making, it does so without advancing any
elaborate ideological claims beyond the basic union task of defend-
ing and improving its members' material interests as workers .... 11
Despite increasing awareness in this country of European and
Japanese systems of worker participation, Americahi unions have shown
little interest in them. The insistence by the United Auto Workers that
its president, Douglas A. Fraser, serve on the board of directors of
Chrysler Corporation, as one of the conditions for giving the company
the economic relief necessary to keep it afloat, was largely a symbolic
gesture; it does not, in my opinion, mark the beginning of a trend.
Nevertheless, we hear much these days about improving the quality
of work life, involving employees directly in the management of enter-
prises, and the "art" of Japanese management. 4 I find it significant that
the most enthusiastic proponents of these ideas tend to be, with few ex-
ceptions, employers whose employees are not organized. As one astute
observer has remarked,
This emphasis on the atmospherics of intimacy and trust at
the workplace is hardly new to professional management in
America. In their attempt to stem the rising tide of unionism
during the first decades of the century, American managers
adopted "work place cooperation" as their slogan, and devised an
elaborate system of committees to represent worker interest....
By the mid-1930s the preeminent business journal, Management
Review, was urging business leaders to give their employees
"what every human being asks for in life: respect for his per-
sonality, his human dignity, an environment that he compre-
hends, and an assurance that he is progressing." ...
Such trust and collaboration was of course nothing more
than a means of motivating and manipulating the work force
while maintaining professional control. . ...5
,1 Workers'Participation in Management. A Review of United States Experience, in
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES, BULL. No. 6, 149, 184 (1969).
" R. PASCALE & A. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT (1981).
, Reich, Book Review, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 27, 1981, at 27, 30-31.
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It is unnecessary, however, and would in any case be unfair, to im-
pugn the motives of all those who are searching for ways of ordering
labor-management relations that will improve or even supplant collec-
tive bargaining. There is nothing sacred about collective bargaining; it is
merely a means to an end, not the end itself. My point is only that
methods of worker participation that appear to be working satisfactorily
in other countries are based on social and industrial systems that are
fundamentally different from our own. As unemployment and business
failures mount, and as a growing number of workers are being replaced
by robots, "which never go on strike, take no coffee breaks, pay no union
dues and ultimately eliminate many of the jobs that unions are making
contract sacrifices to preserve," 6 the system of collective bargaining in
this country is coming under increasing strain; it may have to be
substantially changed, if not entirely replaced. I suggest, however, that
whatever changes are introduced will have to be compatible with our
societal values and industrial experience; attempts to graft onto our
system patterns of labor-management relationships that are based on
quite different assumptions and practices from those in this country
simply will not work.
If, as I have attempted to show, the American system of labor law
and industrial relations is so different from that of most of the rest of the
world, of what value can it be to study corresponding systems in other
countries? Is it ever possible to transplant foreign institutions to the
United States? No one has written about this problem with greater in-
sight and authority than Kahn-Freund. In his memorable essay, On Uses
and Misuses of Comparative Law," he observed that although we com-
monly speak of "transplanting" a human organ, such as a cornea or a
kidney, from one human being to another, no one ever says that a car-
buretor or a wheel is "transplanted" from one automobile to another. He
continued:
Transferring part of a living organism and transferring part of a
mechanism are comparable in purpose, but in nothing else ....
Our insight into the difference between the kidney and the car-
buretor is elementary and intuitive, but it is also very practical
from the point of view of the lawmaker contemplating the use of
foreign models. It makes sense to ask whether the kidney can be
"adjusted" to the new body or whether the new body will "re-
ject" it-to ask those questions about the carburetor is
ridiculous. 8
" Raskin, A Reporter at Large: Unionist in Reaganland, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7,
1981, at 50. Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) has predicted that as a result of the "robotics
revolution" there may be as many as one million jobs in the United States filled by robots
by 1990. DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-6 (Dec. 11, 1981).
" 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974).
78 Id. at 5-6.
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Kahn-Freund took the position that, in the metaphorical language he
was using, foreign institutions, as a class, are neither all living
organisms nor all mere mechanisms; instead, they may fall at any point
along a continuum, of which the kidney and the carburetor are opposite
terminals. But repeating the warning sounded by Montesquieu in his
great work, De l'Esprit des Lois, over two centuries ago, Kahn-Freund
observed that it is "a great coincidence, a concatenation of cir-
cumstances which we can by no means take for granted that an organ for
a living body fits into another, as we do take it for granted that parts of
a mechanism are interchangeable."79
Accordingly, when considering the adoption of labor laws or institu-
tions of other countries -whether they be labor courts, work councils,
some type of worker participation scheme, or anything else-we should
first try to determine at what point along the organism-mechanism con-
tinuum the law or institution would lie. More often than not, the risks of
rejection are likely to be too great to warrant the experiment. As I
argued at the outset, however, the value in studying foreign methods of
dealing with problems similar to ours is to be derived not so much from
the possibility of finding foreign laws and institutions that we can adopt;
rather, it is derived from the new perspectives on our own system that
we gain from such a study-perspectives that may lead to changes com-
patible with our culture and experience.
7' Id. at 7.
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